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THE 
MID-WEST QUARTERLY 
Vol. II] APRIL, 1915 [No.3 
THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE 
EUROPEAN WAR 
When on August I, 1914, the fateful news came over the wires 
that Europe stood at Armageddon, the people of this country 
were scarcely able to accept the fact, for it was difficult to under-
stand why the flower of European manhood should be sent forth 
in arms to shatter the cultural and material progress of a century. 
But to the close student of European diplomacy it has long been 
evident that some day the conflicting interests of the Great 
Powers and some of the smaller states, an intricate system of 
alliances, ententes, and secret agreements, and the armaments 
accumulated in the last generation must produce a "catastrophe 
-of which it is impossible to measure either the dimensions or the 
effects" (Mr. Asquith). The various peoples involved have been 
preparing against the Great War till most of them were near the 
end of their resources, and now that it has come, they have 
accepted their fate calmly and bravely, on the ground that even 
defeat is preferable to uncertainty. The historian, however,. 
is impressed by the peculiar alignment of the warring nations~ 
It is the first war between Austria and Russia, the first between 
England and Germany, the first since 1763 between Germany and 
Russia. Except for the Crimean War, France and England have 
not fought together since the seventeenth century, nor England 
and Russia since the struggle against Napoleon, with whose 
country they are both now in alliance. Finally, except when at 
the beginning of the eighteenth and again of the nineteenth cent-
ury they resisted the ambitions of Louis XIV or Napoleon, 
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Germany (Prussia) and Austria have been inveterate enemies 
since the days of the Reformation. 
The causes of the present war are to be traced to four sets of 
forces, more or less interdependent: (I) the racial problems and 
ambitions of Austria-Hungary; (2) the rivalry of Austria and 
Russia in the Balkan peninsula; (3) the struggle to maintain the 
balance of power in Europe; (4) the competition for sea power, 
commerce, and colonies; not to speak of the burden of arma-
ments entailed by the foregoing rivalries. In this paper an 
attempt will be made to describe the development of these ques-
tions up to the outbreak of the war. 
I. The Racial Problems of Austria-Hungary 
The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, as is well known, is a 
collection of races so organized under the Compromise of 1867 
that a majority of Slavs is held down by minorities of Germans 
and Magyars in Austria and Hungary respectively. But this 
situation has not proved satisfactory to either of the dominant 
races, let alone anyone else. The Magyars, in their desire for 
greater political and economic freedom from Austria and as the 
natural outcome of their political ability, which can be compared 
only to that of the Anglo-Saxons, have endeavoured to force their 
ways upon the non-Magyar races subject to them, with a view to 
increasing the resources available against Austria. Not only 
have the Slavs of Croatia and the Rumanians of Transylvania 
resented this treatment, against which Austria has afforded them 
little relief; their loyalty to the Hapsburg Crown has begun to 
weaken, and they have been impressed by the comparatively free 
institutions of Servia and Rumania. So the Austrian half of 
the Monarchy has learned that Hungarian policy has seriously 
weakened the Hapsburg State in international dealings; while to 
preserve the unity of the joint army, it has made repeated con-
cessions to Hungary which have merely whetted the appetite 
of that partner. Gradually the conviction has spread in the 
Monarchy that somehow or other recognition must be afforded 
to the national life and consciousness of its conglomerate peoples. 
Federalism in one form or another has become a word to conjure 
with and absorbed the attention of publicists. Some favour the 
creation of a third or Slav kingdom out of Carinthia and Dal-
matia (Austrian), Croatia and Slavonia (Hungarian), and 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina (a Reichsland); others desire a centralized 
organization for the entire Monarchy, with adequate local govern-
ment for the various races. The late Archduke Francis Ferdinand, 
though he talked little and gave his chief attention to the army, 
was supposed to favour some such solution. At any rate his sym-
pathies were decidedly with the Slavs; and it is surely an irony 
of history .that the one man who had the will and the power to 
grapple with the problem should have been cut down on the 
eve of his accession to the throne by one of the race whose best 
friend he was. 
To devise a sound foreign policy on the basis of such racial 
antagonisms would be difficult in any case. For Austria the 
task is complicated by the foreign connections of some of the 
races. The Ruthenians of Galicia are of the same stock and speak 
the same language as the Little Russian subjects of the Tsar. 
The Croats are practically Serbs, though their Roman Catholicism 
separates them somewhat from the latter. In southern Tyrol and 
along the Dalmatian coast there is a considerable Italian element, 
and Transylvania contains a majority of Rumanians. How far 
will these races, all of whom have been at one time or another 
susceptible to irredentist propaganda, support the traditional 
policy of the House of Hapsburg, has been a question ever 
present to the German and Magyar ruling classes. 
That traditional policy, as revealed in the annals of four 
centuries, is clearly one of territorial expansion. Since her 
expulsion from Germany in 1866, Austria-Hungary has regarded 
the western Balkans as her theatre of operations, with perhaps 
Salonika as the ultimate goal. This ambition is logical enough, 
for in the last forty years every Great Power has increased its 
territorial possessions. Austria could not be left behind, and in 
1878 she was permitted to "occupy and administer" Bosnia and 
the Herzegovina, as they constituted the Hinterland to her Dalma-
tian provinces, though the fiction of Turkish suzerainty was 
retained. But she could not hope to advance farther along the 
Adriatic coast, because Italy, her ally since 1882, also had designs 
on Albania and would have resisted an Austrian occupation. 
Early in the twentieth century Russia became interested in the 
same region, apart from the fact that Montenegro, whose guns 
on Mount Lovchen commanded the Austrian harbour of Cattaro, 
had long been a Russian protectorate. 
Austria-Hungary was therefore compelled to regard Servia, 
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which she surrounded on two sides, as the only region open to her 
expansion. A hundred years ago when the Servians under Kara 
George were seeking to emancipate themselves from Turkish 
ru1e, they repeatedly asked to be annexed to the Hapsburg Crown. 
The request was refused, doubtless to the regret of later Austrian 
statesmen; but throughout the nineteenth century, Austrian 
influence was dominant in Servia, for the family of Obrenovich, 
which usually possessed the throne, was too weak to stand alone. 
So it was easy for Austria to secure a favourable tariff for her 
goods, in return for which Servia was encouraged to export her 
live stock to Austrian markets; while the Magyars were free to 
carry out their policy in Croatia without fear of agitation in-
spired from Servia. The value of Austrian friendship was 
demonstrated to Servia in 1885. when she rashly attacked Bu1-
garia to prevent the union of eastern Rumelia with Bulgaria 
proper. The aggressor was badly defeated, and only the inter-
vention of the Dual Monarchy stopped the Bu1garian advance 
on Nish. After that King Milan and King Alexander were as 
clay in Austrian hands; and from 1897, when Russia and Austria 
agreed to maintain the status quo in the Balkans, Servia seemed 
to have become the permanent vassal of her great neighbour. 
This situation was upset by the Servians themselves. In 
1903 King Alexander and his consort were murdered in their 
palace by Servian officers who resented his Austrophilleanings 
and the scandals of his court. The new king, Peter Kara-
georgevich, was Russian in sympathy, but he determined to 
rule as a constitutional monarch, and left his ministers to 
their own devices. They cultivated friendly relations with 
Turkey, and by introducing modern packing methods, made it 
possible to ship Servian meats southwards to Salonika and 
beyond. Henceforth Austria cou1d not reduce the politicians of 
Belgrade to terms by closing the Hungarian frontier to Servian 
cattle. She was able to break up a Servo-Bulgarian customs 
union in 1905, but she cou1d not check the material and financial 
progress of Servia, who was strong enough to defy the Monarchy 
for six months, to the utter derangement of the latter's finances, 
when it proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina 
in October, 1908. 
That crisis marks the beginning of the tension which ended 
with the Austrian u1timatum of Ju1y 23, 19~4. Austrian policy 
towards Servia plus Magyar chauvinism in Croatia had led to a 
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recrudescence of Pan-Servian agitation, which aimed at the union 
of the Serbs of Austria and of Servia under the rule of the Servian 
Crown. But the annexation of the "occupied" provinces 
blocked the plan, apparently for ever, which was the more serious 
because in no other way could Servia hope for access to the sea. 
Probably she would have appealed to the sword had not Russia, 
France, and Great Britain advised her to yield. Her declaration 
of March 3 I, I 909, I stated that "Servia recognizes that the fait 
accompli regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights ... and 
she undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude of 
protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the 
annexation since last autumn." As the result of her undertaking 
"to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-
Hungary and to live in future on good neighboudy terms with 
the latter," the relations between the two governments assumed,. 
an air of" correctness," and a satisfactory commercial treaty was 
concluded; but the dormant hostility was revived by the dramatic 
events of 1912-1913. 
The Ballplatz-the Vienna foreign office-had allowed the 
Balkan war against Turkey to proceed on the assumption that the 
hated Servians would be promptly trounced. Instead, they 
marched to victory, occupied western Macedonia, and at the end 
of the campaign proceeded to capture Durazzo on the Adriatic 
coast. Not only would this port give the landlocked kingdom 
its outlet to the sea; the unexpected successes of Servian arms, 
the increase of territory, and the prospect of a permanent Balkan 
alliance made a profound impression on the Slav subjects of the 
Dual Monarchy, whose racial animosities promised to be con-
siderably accentuated. Furthermore, Servia and Montenegro 
had jointly conquered the Sandjak of Novi Bazar, from which 
Austria had retired in 1909, and secured a common frontier which 
would sometime lead to an integral union of the two states. 
This Greater Servia would permanently block the road to Salo-
nika; it could lend powerful support to the Pan-Servian prop-
aganda that was beginning to lift its head again. 
The Vienna government, therefore, felt it necessary to impose 
a veto upon Servian ambitions and demanded the evacuation of 
Durazzo. A dangerous European crisis was produced-for 
I It is quite important to remember that this note was delivered to the 
Powers, and not to Austria, thus. clearly emphasizing the international char-
acter of the Balkan problem. 
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Russia seemed disposed to take up the cudgels for Servia-only 
to be weathered by the creation of an independent Albania that 
was intended to forestall both Servian and Italian aspirations. 
But Austro-Servian relations were not improved by this solution, 
and when Servia recouped herself by defeating Bulgaria in the 
distressing quarrel of the Balkan allies, Austrian rage and dis-
appointment knew no bounds. I The labours of a generation 
were wasted, the new Servia was allied with Greece and friendly 
with Rumania, and the Slavs of the Monarchy rejoiced greatly 
in the success of their brethren. 
Under these circumstances the new orientation of Austrian 
policy was awaited with interest. Just two weeks before his death 
the late Archduke Francis Ferdinand, who was the driving force 
behind the aggressive policy of recent years, received Emperor 
William at Koposnicht in Bohemia, and according to one story, 
secured from him the promise of German assistance for a renewed 
Drang nach Osten. A casus belli could easily have been found in 
the recent concordat between Servia and the Vatican, by which 
the government of Belgrade challenged the traditional claim of 
Austria to protect Roman Catholics in the western Balkans. 
As it turned out, the murder of the Archduke afforded a more 
satisfactory pretext, but it is scarcely open to doubt that had 
Francis Ferdinand lived, there would have been extreme tension 
between Servia and Russia. Whatever the dispute, Russia would 
inevitably have been brought into the dispute. 
2. Austro-Russian Rivalry in the Balkans 
The vast expanse of her territory and the fact that the Baltic 
is closed to navigation during half the year make Russia's natural 
outlet the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, over which Constanti-
nople stands guard; for the greater part of her grain crop, which 
is the chief item of her export trade, is raised on the black lands 
in the southern provinces of her European empire. The fact 
that many ships loaded with Russian grain were cooped up in the 
Black Sea when Italy attacked the Dardanelles in 1912 amply 
vindicates the national desire for a free passage to the Aegean and 
the Mediterranean. But long before economic considerations 
I Since this was written, the speech of Signor Giolitti in the Italian parlia-
ment has revealed that Austria would have gone to war then had she not been 
restrained by her allies. 
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assumed their present importance, historical and political forces 
were driving the Russians along the chemin de Byzance. They 
ever regarded themselves as the heirs of the old Greek empire, 
from which they took their two-headed eagle, and they aspired 
to bring Russian culture to those southern Slavs who are cut off 
from the main Slav stocks by a solid barrier of Germans, Magyars, 
and Rumanians. To achieve her goal Russia has resorted to 
endless intrigue, formed diplomatic combinations galore, fought 
wars innumerable; without, however, advancing her frontier 
perceptibly beyond the Rumanian barrier. But if the main 
Russian current has made little progress, if Constantinople has 
not yet become Tsarigrad, to the great satisfaction of other 
powers, it is historically true that as a result of the Russian cam-
paigns against Turkey, though not always as a realization of 
Russian plans, five Christian states have arisen in the Balkan 
peninsula to become possible outposts of Russian influence. 
Of these five, Greece was too far away and until recently too 
weak to be of particular service; and Rumania, who had saved 
the Russians before Plevna in 1877, only to be "rewarded" by 
the seizure of Bessarabia, a trans-Danubian province inhabited 
by Rumanians, was by this act of ingratitude thrown into the 
arms of Austria-Hungary. But Bulgaria, Servia, and Montene-
gro, new states with slender resources and thoroughly Slav in 
spirit, were excellently suited to serve Russian designs, which 
have usually been opposed by Austria-Hungary, lest she be 
surrounded on three sides by the same power. So for thirty-five 
years after the Congress of Berlin, which put these new states 
on the map, Austria and Russia struggled for ascendancy at 
Sofia, Belgrade, and Cettinje. For some years Bulgaria was pro-
Russian, Servia pro-Austrian, an arrangement quite to the liking 
of the two Great Powers. Prince Ferdinand, however, had 
ascended the Bulgarian throne in 1887 against the wishes of the 
Tsar, and his people resented the hectoring Russian protectorate; 
gradually, therefore, Austria supplanted Russia in Bulgarian 
affection. To offset this, the Russophile Peter Karageorgevich 
became king of Servia. Thus the protege of one Power blocked 
the southward expansion of the other, and since 1903 Austro-
Russian rivalry has been acute. 
About the same time, the intolerable misgovernment of 
Macedonia precipitated a general uprising, in which the Bul-
garians, Servians, and Greeks thought more of exterminating 
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each other than of driving out the Turks who, incidentally 
abetted the good work. The European Powers tried to carry 
through a programme of reforms which should put an end to the 
prevailing anarchy, a task that was really hopeless in the face of 
Austro-Russian jealousies; and the British failure to effect a 
compromise was a potent cause of the Revolution of July, 1908, 
which ushered in the Young Turks, as represented by the Com-
mittee of Union and Progress. Other highly interesting schemes 
were also nipped in the bud by this convulsion. In January, 
1908, Baron Aerenthal, the Austrian foreign minister, ignoring 
the agreement of 1897 which guaranteed the status quo in the 
Balkans, had secured the concession for a railway through the 
Sandjak of Novi Bazar which could be extended to Salonika and 
pave the way for Austria's advance to the Aegean. Russia had 
countered by proposing a line from Nish, Servia, to the Adriatic 
which would block the designs of Vienna and at the same time 
serve her own economic interests. 
Railways and reforms were alike lost sight of in the consterna-
tion produced by the Revolution; and before Europe could 
accommodate itself to the new order of things, Austria-Hungary 
announced the annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina and 
Bulgaria proclaimed her independence. Neither act modified 
the existing situation in reality, though both were violations of 
the Treaty of Berlin, and Russia had, in June, 1908, accepted the 
annexation in principle. But she had stipulated that advance no-
tice should be given of its consummation; this had been omitted, 
and M. Isvolsky, the Russian foreign minister, felt that he had 
been tricked. His vigorous protest was backed by France and 
Great Britain, who demanded a European Conference on the 
ground that a general European treaty could be revised only 
with the consent of all its signatories. The same Powers also 
gave their diplomatic support to the Servian demand for com-
pensation. But inasmuch as none of them was willing to fight, 
Russia bowed before Germany's intervention "in shining ar-
mour," and thanks to the assistance of her ally, Austria scored 
a distinct diplomatic success. 
In the fullness of time, however, the wheel has come full 
circle. The defiance of the public law of Europe was profoundly 
resented in Italy, where it was regarded as the first step towards 
that Austrian advance along the Adriatic which Italy was deter-
mined never to permit. When the opportunity came, Italy 
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went to Tripoli, thus shattering the Triple Alliance because her 
new colony was at the mercy of the French and British fleets 
in the Mediterranean; and when the Turkish resistance proved 
stubborn, she encouraged, if she did not abet, the formation of 
the Balkan League, which practically extinguished the Turkish 
power in Europe. Out of that conflagration arose the new 
Servia which has provoked Austria to bring on the present 
war. For the sake of an unreal triumph, she has been com-
pelled to stake her very existence and to raise for-let us 
hope-a last settlement those problems she desired to avoid 
indefini tel y . 
During the Balkan troubles, Austrian policy seemed almost 
designed to provoke Russia, for the treatment meted out to 
Servia and Montenegro by Count Berchtold aroused intense 
resentment in Russia. But the Russian government avoided 
the trap, if one had been laid. Though making clear its deter-
mination to support Servia if the latter were attacked, it un-
ceasingly counselled moderation at Belgrade and Cettinje and 
declined to lose patience. In the end, Russia gained enormously. 
For, aside from the aggrandizement of Servia, the railway ac-
corded to Servia across Albania to the Adriatic, and the linking-
up of that line with the Rumanian system, promised to give 
Russia her coveted outlet on the Adriatic, to the intense disgust 
of Austrian commercial interests; while Rumania's intervention 
in the Balkan quarrel over Macedonia, with the connivance of the 
Tsar and contrary to the wishes of the Dual Monarchy, meant 
the end of that pro-Austrian policy consistently maintained by 
the Bucharest government since the Congress of Berlin. How 
completely the situation had changed to the disadvantage of 
Austria was clearly revealed in the spring of 1914, when the Tsar 
visited Bucharest for the first time since the formation of the 
Rumanian kingdom and arranged for the marriage of his 
daughter to the heir presumptive of the Rumanian throne. At 
the time of writing (November, 1914), Rumania has not inter-
vened in the European war, primarily because the late King 
Carol was a Hohenzollern, but her public opinion, which was 
never keen for the Austrian alliance, has shown increasing 
restiveness, lest the government neglect a unique opportunity 
to bring the Rumanians of Transylvania and the Bukowina 
under the sceptre of King Ferdinand. Lastly, it was not agree-
able from the Austrian point of view that ever since the Bosnian 
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crISIS Russia has been distinctly cordial to Italy, who is nomin-
ally Austria's ally but really her rival for the control of the 
Adriatic. 
The truth is, the Balkan policy of the Dual Monarchy had 
utterly collapsed, largely because it rested on false premises, 
partly because its directors had sadly miscalculated the course 
of the Balkan wars; but Vienna could scarcely be expected to 
admit defeat without a final effort to save the situation, and 
seems deliberately to have prepared for the present war, of which 
the murder of the Archduke was merely the occasion, not the 
ultimate cause. With respect to the Austrian and Russian 
policies, we must guard carefully against rash condemnations of 
either, for they are quite as legitimate as those of the United 
States, as adumbrated in the Monroe Doctrine. All the Balkan 
states would much prefer to work out their destinies free from the 
interference of any Great Power, but in their weakness and their 
jealousies they have repeatedly turned to their powerful neigh-
bours, and the latter have accepted the omens as suited their 
several interests, just as we have done in Central and South 
America, with results not always happy or intended. 
3. The General European Situation 
The struggle to maintain the balance of power in Europe 
is of long standing. From the sixteenth century onwards, the 
various nations have never doubted that they could retain their 
freedom and their independence only if no one of them over-
shadowed the others, and whenever a single power has threatened 
to become or has become dominant, it has invariably succumbed 
to a coalition of its rivals. Philip II of Spain, Louis XIV, and 
Napoleon illustrate the point. Similarly, however much the 
issues of the present war may be refined, the simple fact is that 
the Allies regard Germany as a menace to their own safety and 
have resolutely determined to crush her. 
Historically, this state of affairs is in no small degree the 
legacy of Bismarckian diplomacy, as exemplified in the unification 
of Germany. The necessity and justice of a united Germany are 
apparent, but the methods employed by Bismarck to achieve it 
have long been the subject of criticism. It is difficult to deny 
that the Iron Chancellor isolated diplomatically, then attacked, 
and ultimately despoiled Denmark, Austria, and France in turn. 
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It is equally true that France, in the person of Napoleon III, 
opposed the unification of Germany, and all things considered, 
the loss of Alsace-Lorraine was only a just punishment; but the 
"editing" of the Ems telegram, which precipitated the war of 
1870, was as brutal and diabolical a manceuvre as history records. 
In short, splendid as the exploits of Bismarck were from the 
German point of view, they generated first in one, then in an-
other, and finally in practically every European country an 
intense suspicion of German policy, a fear lest the new Empire 
should once again apply the tactics of "blood and iron" for the 
purpose of aggrandizement. Nor did Germany endeavour to 
remove this impression. Rather, she took advantage of every 
ruffie in the international situation to increase her army, which 
was already the most formidable in Europe; of recent years she 
has harboured the vision of a fleet which should challenge the 
armada of England; and she has never hesitated to rattle the 
sabre, even going to the point of twice (1875, 1887) threatening 
France with war and of issuing an ultimatum to Russia over a 
Balkan question not of immediate concern to herself (1909). 
Rightly or wrongly, Germany was regarded, at least since the 
accession of William II, as the standing danger to the peace of 
Europe; and the bases of the present coalition were laid years 
ago to ward off, if possible, the very calamity which has at last 
overtaken the Old World. 
As long as Bismarck remained chancellor, this suspicion of 
Germany was less wide-spread. Realizing fully, as he has told us 
in his Reflections and Reminiscences, that Germany, in view of the 
circumstances of her birth and as a newcomer in the family of 
nations, must conduct herself with reserve and circumspection, he 
shaped her policy so skilfully that a coalition against her was 
neither possible nor necessary. France, he saw clearly, could 
undertake a war of revenge only if she were assisted by Austria 
or Russia. He therefore built up a Triple Alliance of Germany, 
Austria, and Italy, which was unnatural in that the two lesser 
partners were hereditary enemies, but was amply justified as a 
defensive arrangement (1879-1882). The terms of the alliance 
have never been published; but its members have always insisted 
on its .purely defensive character, and Italy's neutrality in the 
war confirms their view. The repeated renewal of the treaties, 
and the fact that no power dared to attack Germany testify to 
the prescience of Bismarck; fortunately, he did not live to see his 
208 THE MID-WEST QUARTERLY 
handiwork undone by the bungling diplomacy of his successors. 
With Russia he concluded secret" insurance" treaties to obviate 
the danger of Germany's being dragged into an Austro-Russian 
war over Balkan difficulties--one wonders if his ghost haunts the 
Berlin foreign office in these parlous days-and with Great Britain 
he maintained tolerably cordial relations. Germany, in fact, 
bestrode the continent like a colossus, with the tacit approval of 
the other powers (except France), because Bismarck was generally 
credited with a desire to keep the peace. 
This situation was completely changed after 1890 when 
William II, carried away by a determination to govern as well as to 
reign, dismissed the statesman who "had cut a certain figure in 
the history of Germany and of Prussia." The Emperor an-
nounced that "the course remained the same"; but actually his 
policy was quite different. Its main features-the creation of 
a fleet and the development of imperial ambitions-will be 
examined in the next section of this paper; here it will S1:lffice to 
continue our account of European diplomacy, in the strict sense 
of the words. 
One cause of the breach between Bismarck and the Emperor 
was the refusal of the latter to renew the secret insurance treaty 
with Russia, which was the corner-stone of Bismarck's diplomacy, 
pace the Triple Alliance. Finding himself isolated, the Tsar 
soon formed that unnatural alliance with Republican France. 
which Bismarck had succeeded in preventing and which made it 
possible for Germany to be attacked simultaneously on both her 
frontiers. There was some evidence, however, that this combi-
nation was directed primarily against Great Britain, and William 
II was quick to seize the advantage. On the one hand, he 
supported Russian policy in the Far East (revision of the Treaty 
of Shimonoseki, 1895), on the other he held out the hand of 
friendship to France, who was encouraged to send out the 
famous Marchand expedition that penetrated to Fashoda, on the 
southern border of the Egyptian Sudan, and nearly caused war 
between France and England. In 1898, at the time of our war 
with Spain, he is believed to have proposed an intervention 
against us by Germany, France, and Russia, which was quashed 
by the refusal of England; according to one account, he advo-
cated similar action against England when the latter declared 
war against the Boer Republics, but was rebuffed by the refusal 
of France. These manreuvres are the first symptoms of a rupture 
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between Britain and Germany, but they did not prevent a co-
operative policy in the Far East during the Boxer troubles, and 
in 1901 there was a well-defined movement towards an Anglo-
German alliance, despite the outburst of Anglophobia in Germany 
during the Boer war. The fact is, the fall of Bismarck left the 
diplomatic world without a guiding hand, which was the more 
regrettable because the expansionist spirit was still strong, and 
in a state of flux anything might happen. 
The air was perceptibly cleared by the Anglo-French agree-
ment of April, 1904, the famous entente cordiale, and the Anglo-
Russian Convention of August, 1907. As German writers have 
argued that these reconciliations between England and her 
traditional enemies were inspired by the deliberate aim of King 
Edward VII to isolate Germany and build up a coalition against 
her, it is desirable to analyse the general situation with an open 
mind. When the Boer war was over, Great Britain found her-
self almost friendless in Europe, if indeed the Japanese alliance 
ensured her position in Eastern Asia. With two Great Powers 
she had quarrels of long standing-with France as regards Egypt 
and Morocco, with Russia over Tibet, Afghanistan, and Persia, 
in which neither antagonist was able to score a decisive advan-
tage. It was, accordingly, quite intelligible that the British 
foreign office should offer to compromise, and equally reasonable 
that its offers should be accepted. After long negotiations France 
recognized the British occupation of Egypt in return for a free 
hand in Morocco; in this spirit of give and take it was also possi-
ble to adjust various disputes in Newfoundland, the Niger region, 
Madagascar, Siam, and the New Hebrides. The Russo-Japanese 
war having ended in a division of Manchuria between the two 
combatants, Russia and England were able to strike a bargain in 
the Middle East. Both agreed to keep out of Tibet, Afghanistan 
was recognized as under the influence of Great Britain, and Persia 
was divided into three spheres of influence, one Russian (in the 
north), one British (along the Gulf of Oman), the third lying 
between the other two as a neutral zone; while Russia recognized 
the predominance of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf. No 
more important advances in the direction of a sound diplomacy 
have been made in a century: the legitimate ambitions of each 
party were frankly admitted, and a long list of disputes amicably 
settled, anyone of which might and several of which did almost 
lead to war. As the various documents stand, they seem to be 
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conceived in a spirit of enlightened statesmanship and sound 
common sense. 
Were there any ulterior motives? Do the facts that by forget-
ting their own differences France and England got a free hand 
against Germany and that Russia, thanks to her agreements with 
Japan and England, could interfere with Austrian and German 
designs in the Near East, do these facts justify Germany in say-
ing that she is the victim of a conspiracy hatched by England out 
of jealousy and joined by the Dual Alliance for the sake of 
revanche? Lord Lansdowne and Sir Edward Grey, the British 
statesmen responsible for the agreements, have repeatedly 
declared that they had no point against Germany, the British 
government has denied that it was bound by any military ar-
rangements with its diplomatic coadjutors, and British public 
opinion has indicated very clearly that it was opposed to a formal 
alliance with any European power. None the less, by giving its 
diplomatic support to those powers against which Germany's 
alliance with Austria and Italy was arranged and by receiving 
the support of the same powers against certain German and 
Austrian·schemes distasteful to herself, Great Britain did, beyond 
a peradventure, pursue a policy actually anti-German and some-
times anti-Austrian; while her traditional friendship with Italy 
suggested that the third member of the Triple Alliance was but a 
lukewarm partner. But to admit this orientation is to justify 
it, historically at least, for British continental policy has been 
directed, ever since Wolsey and Henry VIII, towards preserving 
the balance of power; and Britain emerged from her "splendid 
isolation" in the early years of the twentieth century for the 
sound reason that after the Russian disasters in the Far East, the 
Dual Alliance was no longer a match for the Teutonic Powers and 
because in a variety of ways Germany had shown an unmistak-
able hostility not to England alone but to her far-flung Empire 
as well. But if England was thus driven to protect herself 
against Germany, it is equally true that Germany was slowly but 
surely being isolated in the diplomatic game. Here, then, was 
a situation full of dangerous possibilities, and several times before 
1914 an explosion was narrowly avoided. 
The German government had manifested little interest in the 
Anglo-French agreement, as it did not believe that two nations 
who had been rivals for centuries could suddenly strike up an 
effective friendship; but when the battle of Mukden pointed to the 
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collapse of Russian power, Germany determined to recover her 
ascendancy of Europe by an aggressive policy towards France, 
which would incidentally test the value of the entente cordiale. 
In this fashion arose the question of Morocco, which kept Europe 
on tenter-hooks for six years, for Germany claimed that France 
and England had no right to settle this problem without her 
consent. In the opinion of the writer, this position was thor-
oughly justified, not only as an assertion that the Concert of 
Europe still existed, but also in international law. But when 
Germany attempted to impose her solution by threatening France 
with war, the British government was bound by its agreement 
and by its interests to support France by every means in its power, 
as indeed it did in the crises of 1905 and 1911. There is no reason 
for doubting that on each occasion the British army was ready for 
service in France if Germany pressed matters to the limit, though 
in neither case, so far as is known, did Great Britain actually 
threaten Germany. In the light of recent events, it is reason-
able to believe that but for British participation in continental 
affairs, France would have long since been crushed and Germany 
established on the English Channel, and in this fact history will 
probably recognize an ample vindication of British policy. It is 
necessary, however, to emphasize that this policy was in no way 
aggressive, for Anglo-German relations became difficult only when 
Germany manifested hostility towards France, and the British 
press was almost unanimous in saying that England would have 
nothing to do with a war of revenge. Further confirmation of 
this view is found in the agreement of November, 1912. "I 
agree, " wrote Sir Edward Grey to the French ambassador in Lon-
don, "that if either government had grave reason to expect an un-
provoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened 
the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other 
whether both governments should act together to prevent aggres-
sion and to preserve peace, and if so, what measures they would 
be prepared to take in common." There is absolutely no evi-
dence that either France or England ever regarded the entente 
cordiale as a means to attacking the German Empire, which for 
that matter, would have been absurd when Russia, the ally of 
France and the friend of England, was both unable and unwilling 
to fight. 
As regards French policy in general, apart from its relations 
with England, Germany alternately asserted that it was domi-
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nated by the desire for revenge, and endeavoured to transform it 
in her own interest by establishing close economic relations be-
tween the two countries. But the proud Republic consistently 
rejected the German overtures, except for a few months in 191 It 
when M. Caillaux thought of settling the Morocco controversy 
on the principle of a joint exploitation. It is almost impossible 
to determine how far France still nourished the grievances of 1870. 
But her pacific policy during the Balkan crises of 1908-1909 and 
1912-1913 and her dignified calm at the time of the Zabem inci-
dent suggest that she asked only to be left alone, as far as that 
could be reconciled with the Russian alliance. 
The Anglo-Russian Convention gave umbrage to Germany 
because since it secured England's position in the Middle East, 
the latter was willing to support Russian policy in the Balkans, 
in as far as it was directed towards securing genuine reforms in 
Macedonia. But as such reforms were not popular in Vienna 
and Berlin, the story was invented that the object of King Ed-
ward's visit to the Tsar at Reval in June, 1908, was to precipitate 
a Balkan conflict, at the end of which England, France, and 
Russia would divide the Ottoman Empire among themselves 
and their clients. No proof of this plot was ever put forward; 
had there been any such design, the Bosnian crisis would have 
been utilized to further it and would scarcely have ended in the 
humiliating defeat of the Triple Entente. Also, it is well known 
that Great Britain refused to entertain a Russian proposal for 
opening the Straits of Constantinople to men-of-war. Four 
years later, during the Balkan wars, Sir Edward Grey repeatedly 
accepted the Austrian view in the dispute over Albania, even so 
far as to send a British squadron to overawe the Montenegrins 
when they captured Scutari and thought to present Europe with 
a jait accompli. If Great Britain had formed an alliance, even 
defensive, why did Sir Edward Grey, in those momentous days 
of last July, persistently refuse to declare the solidarity of 
England with'the other powers of the Triple Entente, despite 
the most urgent entreaties from Paris and St. Petersburg? We 
now know that in 1912 Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey offered 
to make the following declaration to Germany: 
"The two powers being naturally desirous of securing peace and friendship 
between them, Britain declares that she will neither make, nor join in, any 
unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggression against Germany is not the 
subject, and forms no part, of any treaty, understanding, or combination to 
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which Great Britain is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything 
which has such an object." 
To this proposal, Germany returned an unsatisfactory answer. 
She not only refused to take a corresponding obligation, but she 
demanded a pledge of British neutrality in the event of Germany's 
being engaged in war of any kind. Obviously, Great Britain 
could make no such promise, for Germany could then begin a 
war of aggression at her convenience and could even overrun 
Belgium with impunity. Nothing, therefore, came of these 
negotiations. 
Nevertheless England persevered in the attempt to arrange 
an understanding with Germany. Sir Edward Grey has himself 
stated that as a result of the pacific policy pursued by both gov-
ernments during the Balkan wars their relations "sensibly im-
proved. " Influential individuals and societies-on both sides 
of the North Sea-sought to dispel whatever of hostility there 
was between the English and German peoples, and there was a 
wide-spread desire in both countries for an agreement. The 
possibilities in that direction, as far as England was concerned, 
may be imagined from Sir Edward Grey's despatch of July 29, 
1914, in which he returned to his idea, "hitherto too Utopian, " 
of a general peace treaty. "If the peace of Europe can be pre-
served, and the present crisis safely passed," runs this historic 
document, "my own endeavour will be to promote some arrange-
ment to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be 
assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued 
against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, either 
jointly or separately." This must surely destroy once for all the le-
gend that the one aim of British policy was to surround Germany 
with a ring of iron, and when the circle was complete, pre-
cipitate a general war. Britain's case against Germany may 
safely rest upon this unprecedented proposal, and upon the 
subsequent offer that if France and Russia would not accept 
"any reasonable proposal . . . to preserve European peace, 
... His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to 
do with the consequences." 
The refusal of the German government to respond to any of 
these overtures is the most tragic feature of the war. Were 
London reconciled with Berlin, it might play the mediator be-
tween Paris and Berlin. Frenchmen had certainly not for-
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gotten Alsace-Lorraine, but they were tired of militarism, and they 
had shot their last bolt in the revival of three years' service. If 
the Republic could have been guaranteed against attack, and if 
Germany could have brought herself to concede genuine self-
government to the disputed provinces, one cannot help thinking 
that in time France would have abandoned the Russian alliance. 
A peace league of France, Germany, and England was not more 
unthinkable than was a few years ago the reconciliation of 
England with France and Russia. Then, if the German military 
party was bent on war, it could have waged a campaign against 
Russia, in which the sympathy of the world would have been 
with Germany. 
Why should Germany wish to fight Russia or Russia Germany? 
Hitherto, as joint abettors of the partition of Poland, they have 
considered their interests identical in restraining the schemes of 
the Poles to recover their independence and in preserving mon-
archical absolutism generally against the democratic demands 
of the last fifty years. Likewise in the domain of high policy 
co-operation was long the order of the day. At the time of the 
Crimean War, Prussia steadfastly resisted the urgings of France 
and England to join them. and was rewarded by Russian neutral-
ity in the wars of 1866 and 1870 against Austria and France, 
without which Prussian triumphs would have been impossible. 
Bismarck, to the end of his career, "kept the wire open to St. 
Peters burg" ; and if William II abandoned this policy, he managed 
to preserve excellent personal relations with the Tsar and up to a 
few years ago supported Russian designs in the Middle and Far 
East. As recently as 1910 Russia accepted the German proposals 
for the Baghdad railway, and was then enthusiastically praised 
in the German press for what appeared to be an abandonment of 
France and Great Britain, which countries were then the chief 
antagonists of German diplomacy. Germany did not then regard 
herself as the bulwark of European civilization against Muscovite 
aggression; nor can it be forgotten that during the Russian 
revolution, the authorities of Berlin afforded every facility to the 
Russian government for tracking down' and capturing Russian 
revolutionaries in Germany. 
Russo-German intimacy was shattered by two circumstances. 
First, Russian opinion has gradually become convinced that the. 
road to Constantinople lies throv.gh Berlin. Bismarck's conduct 
at the Congress of Berlin, where he supported England and 
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Russia in demanding the revision of the Treaty of San Stephano, 
dictated as it was by the Russians at the gates of Constantinople, 
caused profound resentment throughout the Tsardom and has 
never been forgotten. Thanks to this, the Russian government 
had no little difficulty in restraining the popular demand for 
war in 1908-1909 when Germany supported Austria-Hungary 
in the annexation of Bosnia, and again in 1912-1913 in the crea-
tion of an independent Albania. Add to this that German culture 
has long been unpopular in Russia; that the commercial treaty 
dictated by Germany during the war with Japan was rather 
unfavourable to Russian interests, and that Germany would 
insist upon its renewal; that Russian material prosperity and 
industrial development has made enormous strides in the last 
five years, but is hampered by the lack of an ice-free port; and 
that for two decades Germany has done her best to regenerate 
Turkey with the purpose of checking the Russian advance: and 
it is quite clear why the present war is immensely popular with 
the Russian masses. 
On the other hand, the Balkan revolution upset the existing 
situation entirely to the advantage of Russia. The crash of the 
Ottoman Empire relieved the Balkan states of the pressure from 
the south and correspondingly aggravated the difficulties of the 
Dual Monarchy, whose Balkan policy Germany had made her 
own, in spite of Bismarck's warning. It was also problematical 
how long Turkey could survive her last operation. From the 
German point of view it was not unnatural that the peace 
strength of the German army should be increased to 875,000 men. 
But the rest of the world saw only additional proof that every 
increase of armaments had been begun by Germany, and it could 
point out that when the other continental nations had followed 
the example of Germany, the latter's position was no better and 
no stronger than before, indeed rather weaker. For Russia, 
irritated by the German chancellor's prediction of a struggle 
between Germanentum and Slaven tum and the sudden contempt 
manifested in Germany for all things Russian, began to stiffen 
her back. She entered a vigorous protest against the reorganiza-
tion of the Turkish army by a German general (January, 1914), 
and allowed the Russian press to reply in kind to a particularly 
abusive article in the Cologne Gazette. These trivialities became 
serious with the Russian announcement that a practice mobiliza-
tion of the army was contemplated for the autumn of 1914; to 
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which the German press replied by freely discussing the desira-
bility of a preventive war with the Russian colossus. 
In this atmosphere of tension and mutual exacerbation, the 
Austrian ultimatum was hurled at Servia on July 23. And when 
we read in the German White Paper that "we (Germany) gave 
Austria an entirely free hand in her action against Servia"; that 
"any action which she might consider it necessary to take ... 
would receive our approval"; and that "we were fully aware in 
this connection that warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hun-
gary against Servia would draw Russia into the field"; it is 
difficult to believe that Germany was not entirely willing for 
war to come. 
The main point of this rather detailed narrative will be 
missed if it has not become apparent that since the accession of 
William II German policy has pursued no definite goal as regards 
the other powers, but has been everything by shorts and nothing 
long. And not only has German policy been incalculable: there 
has been a great deal of talk about the mailed fist, much rattling 
of the sabre, and a wide-spread ventilation of the idea that Ger-
many could "lick all creation"; while particular German diplo-
matists have exhibited a lack of savoir faire most distressing to . 
the polished agents of the older nations. Germany's position 
in the world assuredly was not all that she could desire, in spite of 
her army; but if she has failed to improve it, the blame must 
rest chiefly with the Emperor, his four chancellors, and the 
successive occupants of his foreign office. One and all, they 
have shown but little of that spirit of give and take which is the 
secret of success, they have preferred force to argument, and they 
have convinced the rest of Europe, not to say the world, that the 
ambitions of the Pan-Germans represented the official policy. 
It is significant that one must search far and wide in German 
discussions of international problems for even a suggestion that 
other powers might have legitimate grievances against Germany, 
or that they might not in good conscience regard their interests 
from the German point of view. Jealousy of German commercial 
progress has perhaps had something to do with her present isola-
tion; but the United States has managed to acquire colonies, to 
develop a considerable foreign commerce, and to build a powerful 
navy without exciting universal fear. The trouble with Germany 
is, she has tried to emulate Bismarck; but she has not asked herself 
what was possible, and she has not produced statesmen of his 
THE BACKGROUND OF THE EUROPEAN WAR 217 
calibre who knew how or were able to control a situation created 
by themselves. 
4. The Question oj Expansion 
Behind these various struggles for influence in the Balkans 
and in support of the balance of power, there is the problem pro-
vided by expansionist ambitions of most of the Great Powers. It 
is a work of supererogation to discuss whether any of the nations 
actually needs lands beyond the sea or an increase of European 
territory: it is sufficient to recognize that none of them, with the 
possible exception of Great Britain, has been satisfied with its 
present possessions, and it is safe to say that at the end of the war, 
whichever side is victorious, the vanquished will have to cede 
territory, either in Europe or elsewhere, or likely enough in both. 
In fact, the disposition of other lands and other peoples has been 
the chief occupation of the European chancelleries for the last 
generation; the disputes chronicled in the first three sections of 
this paper show how fragile has been the framework of the Euro-
pean state system when confronted with conflicting colonial am-
bitions, and Armageddon has come precisely because certain 
powers conceived that their aspirations could be realized only 
at the point of the sword. On the whole it is difficult to say 
that one government has been more responsible than its rivals 
for the tension, for all have at one time or another been arrogant 
and unscrupulous, and to this extent all are equally responsible 
for the war. 
In the division of the spoils the Germanic powers have fared 
least well. Austria-Hungary has added only the contiguous 
provinces of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and has seen her 
cherished schemes indefinitely postponed by the Balkan wars of 
1912-1913. Germany has planted her flag in German East and 
Southwest Africa, the Cameroons and Togoland and Kiaochao 
and on a few insignificant islands in the Pacific; but by the side of 
the enormous possessions of Great Britain, France, and Russia, 
these acquisitions are mere driblets. To make matters worse, 
Germany has witnessed an enormous expansion by her present 
enemies in the last thirty years-England in Burmah, Egypt, 
and South Africa; France in Tonkin, Morocco, the Sahara and 
beyond; Russia in Central Asia and Manchuria, not to mention 
her growing influence in the Balkans; even little Belgium has 
secured, in the Congo, a domain more valuable than all the 
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German colonies together. Nor has it escaped Germany's 
attention that France and Russia have more or less excluded 
commercial competitors from their preserves, and that much 
talk has been heard of a customs union within the British 
Empire which would make that astonishing aggregation of lands 
and peoples a self-sufficing economic entity. 
Germany's position is, indeed, difficult enough. The country 
is fast becoming a replica of England. Food is imported in 
increasing quantity, and for their raw materials German manu-
facturers are more and more dependent upon the produce of 
other nations and their colonies. Only a small proportion of 
Germany's exports go to her colonies, as against the fact that 
France, England, and Russia find their best markets in their 
dependencies. N ow there is nothing to prevent any of these 
countries, in a moment of jealousy or blindness, from shutting 
Germany out of both her export and import markets by measures 
perfectly warranted in international law. Furthermore, the 
population of Germany is greater than that of France or the 
white-peopled dominions of the British Crown, yet the German 
emigrant who demands an agreeable climate cannot settle in a 
land ruled by the Kaiser's government. 
In short, Germany contends that she, the most marvel-
lous industrial and commercial nation of the age, which in normal 
circumstances will one day overtake the United Kingdom in the 
gross amount of its foreign trade, has not found a "place in the 
sun" commensurate with her greatness and possibilities. Pros-
perous as she is to-day-or was on the eve of the war-a hundred 
years hence she will be at the mercy of her present enemies and the 
United States, all of which possess enormous tracts of land which 
they are not now adequately using. Why should not Germany, 
whose civilization and culture are equal if not superior to that 
of any other nationality, be given a chance to share in the develop-
ment of virgin soils and backward races? Is not Deutschland 
ilber Alles as reasonable a slogan as Britannia Rules the Waves? 
And Germany believes that for years the allied Powers have 
intrigued and endeavoured to surround her with a network of 
alliances which should once for all forestall those ambitions whose 
realization is a matter of life and death with her; that out of 
sheer jealousy of her wonderful commercial expansion, they have 
denied to her the resources on which her future depends. 
There is not much truth in the charge. To begin with, during 
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the eighties, when the scramble for Africa was at its height and 
Germany had every opportunity to acquire overseas possessions, 
Bismarck deliberately encouraged France in a policy of colonial 
adventure, with the expectation of embroiling her with England 
and Italy and of diverting her from a war of revenge. The ruse 
was successful, and Germany was not attacked; but it was over-
looked that however much Britain and the Latin nations might 
quarrel with each other, they acquired the best lands in Africa 
and Asia, the very regions that Germany has desired of recent 
years to possess for herself. It is further to be remarked that 
Germany obtained her four African colonies through the good 
will of Great Britain, who in each case resigned valid claims of her 
own in order to gratify German ambitions; all differences be-
tween the two powers were satisfactorily adjusted by the Conven-
tion of 1890, which provided, inter alia, for the cession of 
Heligoland to Germany, the best possible proof that Great 
Britain cherished no animosity towards the great continental 
power. As regards France, Germany courted her so assidu-
ously for twenty years after 188o that a conflict of colonial 
ambitions was unthinkable and non-existent. 
In the last decade Germans have complained bitterly of 
Franco-British opposition to their most cherished schemes, 
namely, the Baghdad railway and a partition of Morocco in 
which they should have a share. The last independent state of 
Africa Minor, the Shereefian empire, had long been a victim of 
European intrigue without falling a prey to it. Geography 
suggested that it would round off the French Mediterranean 
possessions; but a convention of 1880 had made Morocco a kind 
of international hunting-ground. The Anglo-French agreement 
of 1904, which recognized French predominance there, was con-
cluded without Germany's being consulted. Instead, however, of 
protesting, the Kaiser's government declared its "cordial" 
acceptance of an arrangement that augured well for the peace 
of the world; not till after the battle of Mukden did William II 
decide that Morocco must be preserved in its territorial integrity 
and independence (speech at Tangier, March 31, 1905). 
The two statements of policy were quite contradictory, but 
each excluded Germany from that share of Morocco which her 
pUblicists and politicians insistently demanded. To the end of 
the controversy her policy remained obscure: in 1906 the Algesiras 
Conference at her demand appointed France and Spain as the 
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agents of the Powers, and Morocco was formally internationalized; 
in 1909 Germany once more recognized the predominant political 
interests of France; in 19II when France, accepting the omen, 
occupied Fez, the German government protested and sent a 
cruiser to Agadir, which port, under the international arrange-
ments sanctioned by Germany herself and to which she appealed, 
was not open to foreign ships. France was certainly not blame-
less in the long discussion, for with the connivance of Great 
Britain she had practically nullified the Act of Algesiras and she 
had not accorded Germany the economic privileges guaranteed 
in the Convention of 1909; but at least she never concealed her 
ambition to annex Morocco sooner or later. In the crisis of 1911 
Germany began, there is much reason to believe, with the inten-
tion of taking southwest Morocco for herself; in the end she 
allowed France to establish a protectorate, in return for conces-
sions of French territory in central Africa that brought her in 
touch with the Congo, upon which she had long nourished designs. 
Germany may have changed her plans because of English inter-
vention; but had she stuck to the position assumed in 1905, that 
Morocco must not be absorbed by any European power, she 
would have been on unchallengeable ground. The conclusion 
seems to be that Germany was using Morocco as a means of 
testing the friendship of England and France, and regarded the 
acquisition of territory in that region as of secondary importance. 
Naturally enough, Great Britain gave France the support prom-
ised in 1904; but she favoured Germany's policy of the open 
door, and she raised no objection to the territorial rearrangements 
in the Congo basin. In his speech of November 27, 19II, anent 
the controversy, Sir Edward Grey stated that British expansion in 
Africa was undesirable, and that "if Germany has friendly ar-
rangements to negotiate with other foreign countries with regard 
to Mrica, we are not anxious to stand in her way any more than in 
theirs"; Britain was not pursuing" a dog-in-the-manger policy." 
As regards the Baghdad Railway, Germany had a clear case. 
From the economic point of view, British and French as well as 
German, there was no reason why a railway should not be built 
from Constantinople across the Anatolian plateau to Baghdad 
and ultimately to the Persian Gulf, and at first there was no 
opposition; in fact, the concession was obtained from the Sublime 
Porte with British help. But British and French capitalists 
were offered only a minor share of the stock, and were excluded 
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from the management; the kilometric guarantees assumed by the 
Turkish government prejudiced the work of reform in Mace-
donia, and must lead to an increase of the Turkish customs; and 
German publicists began to show how an attack on Egypt would 
be feasible after the line was completed. So the British govern-
ment refused its consent for many years. But the situation was 
changed after the German failure in Morocco and the Italian 
occupation of Tripoli: Germany could never dominate the 
Mediterranean, which is the highway of the British Empire; and 
in 1913 both England and France withdrew their opposition to 
the Baghdad line, which had been accepted by Russia in 1910. 
A few more years of peace, and Germany would have achieved 
a diplomatic and economic triumph for which the whole world 
would have been grateful. 
Here attention must be ca11ed to a fact which has been prac-
tically ignored in the chaos of the war. Early in the summer of 
1914 an agreement was reached between Great Britain and Ger-
many which proves up to the hilt that the former was not afraid 
of German expansion. While the details have not been pub-
lished, it is known that Great Britain gave Germany a free hand 
in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, thus removing the last obstacle 
to the Baghdad line, and that an understanding was reached as 
to the disposition of the Portuguese colonies and the Belgian 
Congo in case their present owners were willing to se11 part or 
a11 of those lands. 
But probably no amount of argument and exposition wi11 ever 
convince Germany that England was not her inveterate enemy; 
for by the very fact of being in possession of the most desirable 
lands of the globe, the British Empire was a standing challenge 
to German ambitions. Having by a variety of means, many of 
them questionable from an austere moral standard, established 
herself all over the world, England clearly desired the mainte-
nance of peace and the preservation of the status quo, and her 
complacency received a profound shock by the advent of a power 
that demanded recognition as an equal, that conceived its 
civilizing mission in large and vigorous terms. To Germans 
English suspicions savoured of jealousy, English preparations of 
hypocrisy, a favourite word in their political discussion; and it was 
particularly unpalatable that more than a million Germans had 
found new homes in the scattered British dominions, where they 
had lost touch with their Fatherland. In the fiery lectures of 
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Heinrich von Treitschke, Great Britain was pictured as a great 
robber state, to which the world rendered an unwilling tribute; 
her naval supremacy was called an anachronism in an age when 
all nations used the ocean as a highway of commerce; and her 
supposed hostility to the cause of German unity was proclaimed 
a sufficient reason why Germany should attempt a settlement 
with perfide Albion, which should be "the longest and most 
difficult of all." How widely these ideas had been disseminated, 
was revealed at the time of the Boer War, when all Germany 
seemed to pour forth a long-cherished hatred and contempt of 
England and her institutions; an explosion not unintelligible when 
one recalls the outburst of the Saturday Review. "Were the 
German fleet destroyed tomorrow," wrote the organ of Tory 
chauvinism on September 18, 1897, "there is not an Englishman 
in the world who would not be the richer . . . Germaniam esse 
delendam." As the German government made no effort to 
restrain the excesses of the press, Englishmen assumed that 
German policy was dictated by a considered hostility to their 
Empire and let loose the vials of their own wrath upon their 
Teutonic kinsmen. The press of both countries continued for 
years to poison the minds of their readers; and if indeed the 
circumstances under which this war began show that English 
suspicions were justified, it is none the less true that the attitude 
of public opinion on both sides of the North Sea made the negotia-
tion of an agreement, or at least a detente, unusually difficult, if 
not impossible. 
The real issue between Germany and England, however, has 
been neither the fulminations of the press nor the complaints 
of diplomatic hostility, but the growth of the German navy. 
For this rivalry geography is primarily responsible. The only 
shore line of the German Empire is that of the North Sea and the 
Baltic, from which its merchant fleets go forth to the ends of the 
earth. But across their lines of communication lie the British 
Isles. It is strictly true, as the war has convincingly demon-
strated, that by closing the Straits of Dover and the North Sea 
from Scotland to Norway, the British navy can prevent a single 
German merchantman from reaching the Atlantic Ocean; in 
other words Germany's foreign commerce lies at the mercy of a 
foreign power. On these grounds the Kaiser has demanded of 
his people, and they have willingly provided, the sinews for the 
construction of a fleet "so strong that even for the adversary 
THE BACKGROUND OF THE EUROPEAN WAR 223 
with the greatest sea-power, a war against it would involve such 
dangers as to imperil his own position in the world." This 
quotation from the memorandum attached to the German Navy 
Law of 1900 indicates precisely the ground on which Germany 
has justified her enormous naval expenditure in the last sixteen 
years. Germany has built her fleet solely for purposes of defence, 
in particular for the defence of her commerce. Nor, on theoreti-
cal grounds, can any power take umbrage at this argument, and 
England has always justified her colossal navy on the ground that 
she must always keep the sea open for the supplies of food and 
raw materials, any cessation in the regular arrival of which would 
lay her open to starvation and revolution. 
Why then has the United Kingdom regarded the creation of a 
German fleet with suspicion, and strained every nerve to keep a 
handsome lead? In the first place, because England's position 
is unique. No other nation in the world depends absolutely upon 
the sea for its subsistence. Even to-day, when her flag has been 
swept from the' ocean, Germany is able to import goods through 
neutral countries and to carryon some export trade. England, 
on the other hand, "will be the sea's victim on the day she ceases 
to be its queen." If it is urged that Great Britain can escape from 
her predicament by consenting to the inviolability of private 
property at sea in time of war, she replies that she cannot sur-
render the one weapon available to her for the crushing of an 
enemy-unless she were to raise a conscript army, which would 
be more burdensome than the cost of her navy. Besides, as war 
on land interrupts commerce between the belligerents, it is 
logical that maritime intercourse must be similarly suspended. 
The problem is really insoluble, and both England and Germany 
long ago recognized the fact. 
In the second place, the German fleet was constructed under 
circumstances that Great Britain could not disregard. In order 
to arouse public sentiment in favour of a large naval programme, 
the Navy League, which is little more than a branch of the 
Admiralty, conducted a vigorous campaign in which the menace 
of the British fleet was adduced as the chief argument. The 
press and the professors in the state-controlled universities used 
the most unbridled language, and even in high quarters little 
reserve was shown. ee As my grandfather reorganized the army," 
said the Kaiser on January I, 1900, e, so shall I reorganize my navy, 
without flinching and in the same way, so that it will stand on the 
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same level as my army [the most powerful in the world], and that 
with its help, the German Empire shall reach a place which it 
has not yet attained." To this may be added another quotation 
from the memorandum of 1900: "It is not absolutely necessary 
that the German battle fleet should be as strong as that of the 
greatest naval power, because a great naval power will not, as a 
rule, be in a position to concentrate all its striking forces against 
us." The point of this remark lay in the fact that in 1900 the 
British fleet was scattered all over the world; the most powerful 
ships were stationed in the Mediterranean, and home waters were 
practically defenceless, a distribution dictated by the political 
and strategic problems of the Empire. But in view of the crea-
tion of a German fleet, which seemed intended for use against 
England, it was necessary to abandon most of the foreign sta-
tions and concentrate the squadrons nearer home; a process 
which, begun in 1904, ended with the practical withdrawal even 
from the Mediterranean. This necessity was an important 
factor in bringing about the agreements with France and Russia, 
and Germans have argued that this shifting of British naval 
power was a sign of aggressive intentions; the chronology of the 
process, however, shows that each step was taken after and not 
before each increase of the German navy. 
The third reason for England's distrust of Germany was 
i found in the size and character of the German fleet. The navy ;:1 
law of 1900 provided for a fleet of thirty-eight battleships, four- .~ 
teen large cruisers, and thirty"'eight small cruisers, together with a .j 
large torpedo-boat flotilla, to be completed by 1920. Laws of 
1906 and 1912 increased this programme to forty-one battleships 
and twenty cruisers; by substituting battle cruisers for the 
cruisers, and by providing for the automatic replacement of 
obsolete ships, the scheme envisaged a fleet of sixty-one battle-
ships of the latest type, that is to say, of Dreadnoughts, which 
would constitute the most powerful armada in the history of the 
world. As the Dreadnought type was introduced by the British 
Admiralty, it is fair to say that by its own action it superseded 
the splendid fleet created since the Naval Defence Act of 1899. 
The all-big-gun ship, however, had been foreshadowed by Italian 
and American constructors, and it was the intelligent anticipa-
tion of England in 1905 which has given her such overwhelming 
odds against her present enemy, if indeed at an enormous and 
ever-increasing cost. But sixty-one battleships of any kind 
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would have worried Englishmen, because battleships are not 
built to protect a nation's commerce; that function appertains 
to light cruisers, of which Germany has built few, and a battle 
fleet was superfluous for her coast defence. Convinced, therefore, 
by the size and character of the German fleet and the tone of 
public discussion in Germany that England or her Empire would 
one day be the victim of German aggression, Englishmen sub-
mitted to heavy taxation in order to preserve a margin of even 60 
per cent. for their own navy, and it may be that the future historian 
will lay upon England the responsibility for the burden of arma-
ments which has given the war its Titanic mould. In justice to 
Germany one must admit that a section of the Conservative 
party in England advocated a "preventive" war against Ger-
many before her fleet became too formidable. The Civil Lord 
of the Admiralty, in the Balfour government, said at a dinner, 
according to one account, that the German fleet could be de-
stroyed before people read in the newspapers that war had been 
declared. In 1909 there was a kind of panic about the alleged 
inadequate shipbuilding programme of the Asquith government, 
in the course of which Germany was accused of secretly accelerat-
ing the construction of its ships; and much against its will the 
Liberal cabinet was constrained to sanction the addition of eight 
Dreadnoughts in a single year. Likewise, the movement for 
universal military service, so ably conducted by the late Lord 
Roberts, was bound to give offence in Germany, because she was 
openly referred to as the enemy against whom a conscript army 
might be used. 
On the whole, however, the present government of Great 
Britain sincerely exerted itself to moderate the naval rivalry. In 
1906 and 1907 it built only three capital ships, instead of the four 
recommended by the late Conservative ministry, and in 1908 
only two; without meeting with any response from Germany, who 
increased her programme (two ships in 1906, three in 1907, four 
in 1908: this was the cause of the panic of 1909). At the Hague 
Conference of 1907 the British delegates were instructed to pro-
pose a limitation of armaments, to which Germany demurred. 
Since 1911, when he became First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. 
Winston Churchill has twice proposed "a naval holiday," and 
finally struck an unofficial bargain with Admiral von Tirpitz 
for a ratio of sixteen to ten in the construction of battleships. 
In addition, from 1907 to 1912 the British government con-
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ducted intermittent negotiations with Germany anent the whole 
question. Germany demanded a political agreement, and 
assuredly this was the one avenue of escape from an insuperable 
dilemma; for only if each government was convinced of the sin-
cerity arid good faith of the other, was it possible, under the 
circumstances, to ignore the possibility of an unprovoked attack. 
So in 1912 Great Britain offered to pledge herself not to attack 
Germany or to join any combination which had such an object 
in view. This was not satisfactory to Germany, who required 
a declaration of absolute neutrality on the part of England in 
any war to which Germany might be a party, and the idea was 
dropped. Nevertheless, the resolute determination of Great 
Britain to retain her maritime supremacy, the abundant proof 
that she was riot a colossus with feet of clay, and the rally of the 
Empire to her assistance had left its impression upon Germany; 
and in view of the colonial agreement the outlook for a definitive 
naval understanding was promising. / 
As regards the commercial rivalry of England and Germany, 
which in some quarters is held up as the real cause of their war, 
it may be remarked that for years Germany has been England's 
best customer, not excluding British India, and that she has 
bought more from Germany than any country except the United 
States. The reciprocal trade of the two nations in 1913 
amounted to over 1'100,000,000. Again, an examination of the 
trade figures shows that about 7S per cent. of Germany's foreign 
commerce is with countries of the European continent, to which 
Great Britain sends only about 40 per cent. of her exports; in 
the overseas dominions of the British Empire, with which the 
110ther Country does one-third of its business, German commerce 
has but a slight hold. While it cannot be denied, therefore, that 
there is a certain general competition between the two countries, 
it is quite evident that this has been very much exaggerated, and 
that they are mutually dependent. Finally, it is a gross misrep-
resentation to say that British trade is being extinguished by the 
advance of Germany. Germany had to catch up with England's 
lead of three-quarters of a century, and since 1907 the former has 
about held her own. The following table, which is calculated 
in millions of dollars, speaks for itself. I 
I Approximate figures only. The exports from the United Kingdom refer 
to British products only. The re-export trade would increase the exports by 
about one-fourth. 
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UNITED KINGDOM GERMANY 
YEAR 




1890 2100 1315 1120 790 
1899 2425 15 1320 0 1360 2I.5 1000 27 
1903 2710 12 1450 10 1580 16 1250 25 
1907 3225 19 2130 47 2250 42 1770 41 
1911 3400 6 2270 6 2385 6 2025 11.5 
1911 3400 6 2270 6 2385 6 2025 1I.5 
1912 3775 II 2435 7·5 2530 6 2185 7·9 
1913 3845 1.9 2630 8 2665 5 2480 13·5 
But these figures do not consider the growth of population, 
which between 1890 and 1910 stood at 26 per cent. for Germany, 
as opposed to 18 per cent. for the United Kingdom. From the 
following table showing the exports per head of the population, it 
would appear that the advantage, in recent years, actually rests 
with England. 
UNITED KINGDOM GERMANY 
Average 1900-I 904 $31.81 $19.78 
" 1907-1910 44.32 25.81 
1911- 1913 54·55 34.31 
Increase 1900-1913 $22·74 $14·53 
Leaving figures aside, it would be exceedingly difficult to prove 
that the British people were jealous of Germany's prosperity. 
Intelligent discussion of the subject always emphasized the fact 
that the two countries were partners, not rivals; the tariff reform 
movement, which was to save England-and the Empire-from 
German competition was repudiated in three general elections; 
neither in the United Kingdom nor in any part of the Empire 
governed from London-that is, except in the self-governing 
dominions-have Englishmen enjoyed any trading privileges that 
were not available for Germans as well. Since the war began, 
there has been no looser statement than that which ascribes 
England's participation to a jealousy of Germany's commercial 
prowess; for war means the interruption of business, and England 
suffers more from that than any other nation. 
There is, then, no reason for rejecting Mr. Asquith's state-
ment that Great Britain is fighting for the maintenance of the 
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public law of Europe and the right of small nationalities to exist; 
to which may be added, considerations of enlightened self-
interest. Until the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany, 
English opinion was almost unanimous in favour of standing 
aside, and Sir Edward Grey repeatedly told France that English 
help was dependent upon popular sentiment. The promise of 
naval assistance was not given until Germany had sent her 
ultimatum to Paris, and that was conditional. But the German 
affront to Belgium left England no alternative. The promise 
to compensate Belgium after the war and to respect her indepen-
dence and integrity, coming as it did from a government which, 
on its own admission, had broken its pledged word, was obviously 
worthless, apart from the fact that the exponents of German 
expansion have long held that Belgium must one day be incorpo-
rated in the German Empire. Now since the fourteenth century 
England has consistently opposed the absorption of the Low 
Countries by a strong power; this was the issue in her struggle 
with Louis XIV, and she entered the lists against the French 
Revolution precisely because the First Republic was bent on 
extending its frontier to the Rhine. So in 1914. The aggression 
of Germany threatened to upset the balance of power; were she 
successful, would not England be her next victim? The truth 
is, so inevitable was the participation of England if Belgium were 
molested that Germany must actually have desired to see Eng-
land drawn in; or else her statesmen and diplomatists are the 
sorriest and most incapable that ever directed the destinies of a 
great nation. 
The documents found in Brussels merely show that England 
was prepared to resist a German invasion of Belgium; and in the 
spring of 1913 Sir Edward Grey officially assured the Belgian 
government that England intended to respect the neutrality of 
Belgium if other powers did so. Until Germany can prove that 
an unprovoked attack upon her by way of Belgium was planned 
by Great Britain, we shall continue to hold the mistress of the 
seas guiltless of provoking the great conflagration and justified 
in taking part. As to her "bloodguiltiness" and" treachery" 
to the Teutonic race, it is enough to remember that Germany 
did not discover "the Slav peril" until two years ago, and that 
for more than a decade she has been practically the ally of the 
Unspeakable Turk. 
With every desire, therefore, to do justice to Germany's 
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appeal for a fair judgment, one can only admit that in the court 
of history she must bear the major responsibility for the greatest 
of all wars. 
In conclusion, one cannot help feeling that behind the mazes 
of diplomacy and the ambitions of nations, there has long existed 
on the part of governments and peoples alike, or certain of them, 
a subconscious desire to make use of the colossal armaments 
accumulated during the last generation. Not that there was 
any murderous intent or willingness to be shot, but the battle-
ships and the armies had produced no return as investments, and 
in spite of Norman Angell's argument that war does not pay in 
the long run, many millions of men were certainly disposed to 
have at least one more try before the world settled down to a 
monotonous and everlasting peace. The fighting spirit is not 
yet dead in the human race; on the contrary, modern democracies 
have often shown themselves more chauvinistic than the govern-
ments entrusted with the conduct of international relations. 
Nor are the hatreds and animosities engendered by centuries of 
conflict and aspiration to be killed off in a day, even by an appeal 
to the pocket-book. To the peoples of Europe Louis XIV and 
Frederick the Great, Napoleon and Bismarck still stand for great 
causes or great crimes; while the wars of the nineteenth century 
left behind them more problems than they solved. And so, just 
as the individual will often sacrifice his material welfare on the 
altar of an ideal, the embattled nations of Europe are willing to 
suffer infinite pains if only their several destinies, as they con-
ceive them, may find opportunity of realization. 
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